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Neopragmatism and the Christian Desire for a Transcendent God:
Is a Meaningful Dialogue Possible?
Let me begin by clarifying key words in the title of the paper—"neopragmatism," "desire," and
"transcendent God"—and then address the point of the question: Is a meaningful dialogue possible? The
neopragmatist perspective with which I will dialogue is that of Richard Rorty, arguably the most
important representative of this form of doing philosophy. The desire (and the intellectual requirement)
that God be in some sense "other," and thus not subsumable under human description without remainder,
I take to be basic to the logic—the "deep grammar"—of Christian belief and practice. Trying to get
Rorty and the theologian to ruminate about the need to assert God’s transcendent reality may prompt
some readers to rephrase the above question from Is a meaningful dialogue possible? to Is there a point
to such a dialogue? Prima facie such readers may have a point; for Rorty is a self-avowed atheist whose
liberal utopia will be "enlightened, secular through and through" and one in which "no trace of divinity
remained. . ." (Rorty 1989:45).
The radically historicist moorings of Rorty’s philosophy, coupled with his incessant invectives against
absolutes, noncontingent truth, and transcendence, have led theologians and philosophers of religion to
rather different judgments about the viability of meaningful dialogue with the philosopher’s
neopragmatism. Jespers, for example, declares that many Christian theologians will find Rorty’s
disavowal of transcendence prohibitive of meaningful dialogue (Jespers 1993:249), while Robbins (1994;
1997) considers Rorty’s perspective quite congenial for constructing a form of religious humanism. I find
myself somewhere between Jespers and Robbins. With Jespers, I acknowledge that Rorty’s dismissal of
transcendence poses real problems for the theologian’s desire to speak of God as transcendent Other;
however, with Robbins, I find much of Rorty’s neopragmatism powerfully incisive, stimulating, and
convincing—particularly Rorty’s trenchant critique of the conceptual (and moral-ethical) excesses of
Western metaphysics and foundationalism, as well as his courage to envision a way of thinking and
living that honors the utter historicity, linguisticality, contingency, and finitude of human existence. In
this paper, then, I will risk a dialogue with Rorty’s neopragmatism precisely around the possibility of
construing transcendence in such a way that it honors the Christian demand for God’s "otherness," while
in doing so it not take leave of history, contingency, and finitude. This dialogue will be threefold: First, I
assess Rorty’s understanding of religion and its quest for transcendence. Second, I argue that Rorty’s
construal of transcendence is too restrictive, prompting him to unnecessarily throw the theological baby
out with the metaphysical bath water. Finally, I present briefly the contours of a postmetaphysical
understanding of God’s transcendence that respects Christianity’s need for God as genuine Other, but that
at the same time takes seriously Rorty’s emphasis on history, contingency, language, and time.
I
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It is crucial to note at the outset that Rorty’s misgivings about theology and its attempt to speak about
God as transcendent Other are of a piece with his critique of Western metaphysics and foundationalism.
Therefore, to appreciate Rorty’s views on religion and on God, it is necessary to take a brief look at his
critique of Western philosophy.
For Rorty, there are two ways in which thoughtful people, by situating themselves in a larger context,
can make those lives meaningful. Rorty names the first way the desire for "objectivity" and the second
the desire for "solidarity." People who desire solidarity do so "by telling the story of their contribution to
a community"—the community can be the actual historical one in which they live, or an imaginary future
one (Rorty 1991:21). People who crave objectivity describe themselves "as standing in immediate
relation to a nonhuman reality" (21). These two ways express themselves in two very different self-
images:
Insofar as a person is seeking solidarity, she does not ask about the relation between the practices of a
chosen community and something outside that community. Insofar as she seeks objectivity, she distances
herself from the actual persons around her not by thinking of herself as a member of some other real or
imaginary group, but rather by attaching herself to something which can be described without reference
to any particular human beings (21).
As Rorty tells it, the intellectual tradition of the West—from Plato to the Enlightenment, and beyond—
has been for the most part a story of the quest for objectivity. Beginning with the Greeks, philosophers
have unmediated access to this "something which can be described without reference to . . . human
beings"—call it Truth, the Good, Reality, God, or whatever—by constructing metaphysical systems in
which the following sorts of concepts have a point: the distinction between knowledge and opinion and
between appearance and reality; truth as correspondence to reality; thought or language as a medium of
representation; epistemology; realism versus relativism, and so on. Descartes’ attempt to locate this
immediate relation to "nonhuman reality" in the thinking cogito and Kant’s hope to reach objective truth
by way of the invariant, universal structures of consciousness are simply two celebrated examples of the
same Western desire for objectivity—for ahistorical foundations for truth and morality that would escape
the vicissitudes of time, chance, and contingency. For Rorty, logical positivism and the debates in the
philosophy of language over "realism versus antirealism" and "representationalism versus
antirepresentationalism" are merely twentieth-century attempts to update Western philosophy’s
foundationalist quest for certainty (Rorty 1991:1-17). So are attempts by philosophers of science to name
science a "natural kind"; that is, to privilege science in terms of the rest of culture by way of "a special
method, or a special relation to reality" (Rorty 1991:46).
Rorty thinks that philosophy’s search for ahistorical, absolute foundations for truth or goodness, or the
nature of reality or of human beings has been a failure; the "Platonic tradition" has simply "outlived its
usefulness" (Rorty 1982:xiv). Beginning with Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Rorty has
invoked the talents of (among others) Nietzsche, the later Wittgenstein, Derrida, James, Dewey, and
Davidson to launch a sustained and often brilliant critique of Western philosophy. The chief reason for
the failure of Western philosophy, Rorty avers, has to do with its "impossible attempt to step outside our
skin—the traditions, linguistic or other, within which we do our thinking and self-criticism—and
compare ourselves with something absolute" (Rorty 1982:xix). For Rorty, the Western intellectual
tradition is littered with failed attempts to provide a method, an epistemology, an ideal language, or a
metaphysics that will make it possible to transcend the "finitude of one’s time and place, the ‘merely
conventional’ and contingent aspects of one’s life" (xix) and intuit directly the nature of Truth or Reality
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or Nature or God. The ineluctable historicity and finitude of our lives, coupled with the ubiquity of
language, make that impossible; we never encounter reality "except under a chosen description" (xxxix).
The pragmatist sees the repeated failure of the Platonic tradition as reason enough to abandon it—to
suggest that we "change the subject" (Rorty 1982:xiv). In changing the subject, the pragmatist seeks to
foster among intellectuals the desire for solidarity. Partisans of solidarity do not look for skyhooks with
which to escape from contingency so that they may see reality whole—they do not aspire for a God’s eye
view. They are content to live in the thick of history, time, chance, and finitude. Pragmatists resist the
temptation to hypostasize "truth" or "goodness" or "reality," thus turning them into objects with
"essences" about which one should have an epistemological theory (Rorty 1982:xiv, xviii). Instead, they
repudiate the very notion of "anything—mind or matter, self or world—as having an intrinsic nature to
be expressed or represented" (Rorty 1989:4). Truth is not "out there" in the world, waiting to be
discovered by applying the proper philosophical method (5); rather, truth is a property of sentences
(Rorty 1982:xiv), an "expression of commendation" (Rorty 1991:23) for beliefs that are currently paying
their way. The world is indeed out there, existing in space and time independently of human beings; but
the world does not possess an intrinsic nature—hence, it "cannot propose a language for us to speak"
(Rorty 1989:6). Nor do human beings have an intrinsic nature. The pragmatist insists that "socialization,
and thus historical circumstance, goes all the way down—there is nothing ‘beneath’ socialization or prior
to history which is definatory of the human" (Rorty 1989:xiii). If there are no ahistorical essences to be
discovered, then language ceases to be viewed as a medium, "something standing between the self and
the nonhuman reality with which the self seeks to be in touch . . ." (Rorty 1989:10-11). Language neither
represents the nature of reality or the world, nor expresses the nature of the self; instead, language is a
tool helping human beings cope with reality (11).
In turning away from the quest for objectivity, partisans of solidarity turn to concrete communities,
working to make such communities democratic, open, and free. Such liberal utopias exist for the purpose
of providing the space needed for creative individuals—Rorty calls them "strong poets"—to engage in
projects of self-creation, reweaving the inherited scripts of their lives so as to "give birth" to themselves.
Facing the terror of being merely a "copy" or "replica," strong poets continually redescribe the lives they
have inherited, making the past bear the impress of their creative self-assertion; in this way, the strong
poet will be able to say with Nietzsche, "Thus I willed it" (Rorty 1989:29). The solidarity that provides
the social bonds in Rorty’s liberal community, as Wallace observes, does not exhibit the positive ethic of
normative philosophy and theology, which upheld the universal ideal that insofar as all people possess an
inner light or are bearers of God’s image, social organization has a sure foundation upon which to
reconcile differences and build community. Rather, his answer is a negative ethic of bourgeois
individualism: the acquisition of a private vocabulary implies the importance of public institutions and
spaces for making this acquisition possible and fruitful. ‘Without the protection of something like the
institutions of bourgeois liberal society, people will be less able to work out their private salvations’"
(1996:58).
Rorty’s ideal of the strong poet and the morality of the ceaseless play of aesthetic self-creation provides
an appropriate entry-point for a discussion of Rorty’s view of religion and theology. For Rorty, self-
creation is possible only in the space left by the demise of the desire for "objectivity"; that is, the strong
poet’s desire for imaginative self-creation becomes the very opposite—and takes the place of—the
theologian’s and the metaphysician’s desire to be "guided" and "constrained" by nonhuman powers, and
not left to their own devices (Rorty 1982:xxxix). That is why Rorty’s ideal society will be atheistic,
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secular through and through, one in which no trace of divinity or transcendence remained, and in which
human beings would no longer feel the desire—or see the need—to be responsible to nonhuman forces
(Rorty 1989:45). Such a culture will necessarily be a dedivinized and detranscendentalized one.
It is important to keep in mind that Rorty does not distinguish between Western philosophy’s quest for
"objectivity" and theology’s quest for a transcendent Deity—these two projects are inextricably
intertwined. Indeed, Rorty sees at the root of modern metaphysics and foundationalism a distinctly
theological motivation: talk about the human being or the world as somehow possessing an intrinsic
nature which may be "discovered" by the poet or the scientist is a consequence of a theological view
which understood the world as a divine creation, as "the work of someone who has something in mind,
who Himself spoke in some language in which He described his own project" (Rorty 1989:21). The
theologian’s attempt to find the appropriate language in which to speak about the transcendent God is no
different from the metaphysician’s attempt to discover the right language through which to gain
unmediated access to Truth or Goodness—both projects attempt to establish "links to something Beyond"
(Rorty 1982:xlii-xliii), to escape from history, time, and change in order to compare themselves "with
something absolute" (xix). Since Rorty cannot conceive of any form of religion (or, by implication, any
theology) "which would not be subject to [his] objections to the Platonic tradition" (Louthan 1996:179),
he debunks theology by appealing to the same epistemological arguments he uses to show the conceptual
incoherence of metaphysics and foundationalism, and the uselessness of notions such as the
appearance/reality distinction, language as medium of representation, and the correspondence theory of
truth.
However, to limit a treatment of Rorty’s misgivings about theology to a conceptual and metaphysical
level would be a mistake. For, as may have become clear by now, Rorty’s opposition to theology’s need
for a transcendent God and metaphysics’ quest for ahistorical foundations has a deeply moral and ethical
basis in his thought. For Rorty, religious devotion to God’s reality is diametrically opposed to human
self-reliance; and, Rorty avers, "it would be more courageous, more self-reliant just to rely on ourselves,
on our own group efforts" (Louthan 1996:179). But one may ask: Why is relying on ourselves more
desirable than relying on God, or on some other nonhuman power? Why privilege the virtue of self-
reliance?
In answering these questions, let us note the stark dichotomies that have become apparent in Rorty’s
philosophy thus far: either objectivity or solidarity; either transcendence or contingency; either obedience
to nonhuman powers or dionysian self-creation. Moreover, observe that the quest for objectivity and
transcendence is always an attempt to escape from history, language, and contingency. The "nonhuman
powers" are always absolute, ahistorical, beyond time and chance. Rorty’s position thus creates a logic of
mutual exclusion, presenting the thoughtful interpreter with an simple either/or choice in terms of the
self-image and the allegiances she may aspire to: either a pragmatist or a metaphysician, either a believer
in an ahistorical God or a strong poet and self-creator, and so forth. Furthermore, the logic of mutual
exclusion creates a relationship of power that is absolute: that which is ahistorical and beyond time and
chance is not malleable, not subject to human manipulation, and thus floats free of human creative
influence. Such imperviousness to human power makes these ahistorical realities not only useless for
human projects, it makes them positively anti-human. The anti-human nature of these nonhuman powers
comes through clearly in the following passage in which Rorty describes the project of the
metaphysicians—the Greek philosophers, the empirical scientists, and the German idealists. All of them
were going to explain to us the ultimate locus of power . . . They would thereby inform us what we
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really are, what we are compelled to be by powers not ourselves. They would exhibit the stamp which
had been impressed on all of us. This impress would not be blind, because it would not be a matter of
chance, a mere contingency. It would be necessary, essential, telic, constitutive of what it is to be human.
It would give us a goal, the only possible goal, namely, the full recognition of that very necessity, the
self-consciousness of our essence (Rorty 1989:26).
Note that to the extent that ultimate power resides in the "powers not ourselves," human beings are
necessarily disempowered. No wonder that Rorty construes the unilateral distribution of power in terms
confrontation: we are compelled by these noncontingent realities; they cause us to see the way things
"really are" (Rorty 1979:163); they constrain us to see the truth about the world (Rorty 1982:xxxix). To
the extent that Nature’s own impress has been impressed on all of us, true self-creation is impossible.
Creative imagination finally remains mimetic, merely mirroring the necessary "self-consciousness of our
essence." The existence of an ahistorical essence—an impress that is necessary and essential—elides the
authentic freedom the strong poet needs to demonstrate that he is not merely a "copy" or "replica" of the
"blind impress that chance has given him," that he is able to "make a self for himself by redescribing that
impress in terms which are, if only marginally, his own" (Rorty 1989:43). Not only do transcendent
realities diminish genuine human freedom and novelty, they are also deeply alienating: insofar as human
nature is invariant and necessary, the strong poet will always be forced to repeat a preexisting script. She
will never be able to make her life bear the idiosyncrasies of her impress; that is, in the final analysis, she
will never be able to truly own her life, to be able to declare over it, "Thus I willed it" (see Rorty
1989:29). For Rorty, then, allegiance to nonhuman powers, including the transcendent God of Christian
theology, is finally inimical to human freedom, novelty, and creativity. In short, for humans to flourish,
the gods must die. To return to the above questions: For Rorty, self-reliance becomes an ethical act of
profound courage, because it chooses for human solidarity, freedom, and self-determination against the
false security of the necessary, the noncontingent, and the transcendent.
II
How does the theologian respond to Rorty’s construal and critique of metaphysics and foundationalism—
and, particularly, his critique of the Christian desire for a transcendent God? Rorty presents the
theologian with a two-pronged challenge: On the one hand, Rorty suggests that the notion of a
transcendent God is conceptually incoherent. That is, since such a notion shares the foundationalist
assumptions of metaphysics, it suffers the same fate. On the other hand, belief in a transcendent God is
ethically undesirable. That is, in our day, such a belief has become a hindrance to self-reliance, to a trust
in the powers of human imagination and ingenuity to realize heretofore unimagined possibilities.
In responding to Rorty’s critique, it helps to note that the conceptual and ethical aspects of Rorty’s
critique presuppose each other. It is precisely because Rorty’s argument creates such absolute conceptual
oppositions between, say, objectivity and solidarity, or transcendence and contingency, that the notion of
transcendence comes to be seen as the very opposite of human freedom and flourishing. In other words,
Rorty’s ethical objections to transcendence gain their argumentative force only because of the sharply
dichotomous way in which terms like "transcendence" and "solidarity" function in Rorty’s conceptual
apparatus. To be sure, if transcendence is necessarily ahistorical, atemporal, and extralinguistic, then it
falls victim to Rorty’s criticism of metaphysics, foundationalism, realism, and so forth. Further, if
transcendence is necessarily the metaphysical construct that Rorty claims it is, then its power is
unilateral, confrontational, oppressive, and inimical to human flourishing. But there is no need for the
theologian to accept these forced dichotomies in Rorty’s argument. Indeed, whether Christian theology
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has ever construed God’s transcendence in the ahistorical, absolutist terms that Rorty suggests, is highly
debatable. In any case, the theologian should refuse to accept the strained oppositions of Rorty’s
argument. Instead, she should extricate talk about God from the metaphysics with which Rorty lumps it,
and make the case for a postmetaphysical and postfoundationalist construal of God’s reality. Such a view
of the divine Other floats free of Rorty’s dichotomies, and reinscribes the desiderata of human freedom
and creativity, and of God’s transcendent otherness in ways that are thoroughly historical, contingent, and
liberative. I will sketch the contours of such a theological understanding of God below.
It is theologically significant that some scholars, notably Mark Wallace and Mark C. Taylor, attribute
Rorty’s seeming "tone-deafness" to transcendence—to "otherness," including the Divine Other—to his
vestigial attachment to the canons of positivist thought. As Wallace observes, for the positivist "the gods
are dead and human experience is devoid of any epiphanic moments where something More or Novel can
be manifested to the interpreter" (Wallace 1996:60; also Wallace 1993:250). He continues:
In vintage Enlightenment form, Rorty champions the exigency of throwing off the shackles of authority
and convention. . . . In fact, however, his strident constructivist orientation is of a piece with the
longstanding Western emphasis on the authority of the rational self as the final tribunal for all claims to
truth (Wallace 1996:60).
Similarly, in his essay "Paraletics," Mark C. Taylor argues that the subject-centered structure of Rorty’s
hermeneutical "dialogue" elides genuine otherness by "colonizing" the other (1990:129); therefore, "the
‘other’ is not really other but is actually a moment in one’s own becoming" (131). While I agree with
Wallace and Taylor that Rorty’s suspicion of the utility of the transcendent, and specifically the notion of
a transcendent God, may be rooted in his analytic-empiricist background, one should also keep in mind
Rorty’s critical and highly nuanced relation to the Enlightenment heritage. So, for example, J. Wesley
Robbins is quite right to criticize Taylor for attributing to Rorty typical Enlightenment predilections such
as human usurpation of divine creative powers, and the sorts of dualisms that necessitate "an economy of
representation" and truth as correspondence with reality (Robbins 1992:391). For Rorty, the death of God
does not turn human subjects into little gods, aggressively stamping out any appearances of divinity. In
fact, Rorty explicitly rejects the "aggressive atheism" of people like Sidney Hook who tried to argue that
theism is unworthy of serious consideration because it is insufficiently "scientific" and "rational" (see
Rorty 1991:63-77). Rorty realizes that such aggressive atheism inevitably forces the pragmatist to play
the metaphysician’s self-refuting game. Rather, Rorty’s rejection of transcendence and the gods, and his
counsel that human beings wriggle free from tutelage to nonhuman powers and instead opt for self-
reliance, may have more to do with the moral he draws from the failed history of the Western
metaphysical—and with it, the theological—tradition. The conceptual and ethical aporias besetting
metaphysics and theology mean that these traditions have ceased to be "live options" for us inhabitants of
the rich North Atlantic democracies; they are simply not working anymore (Rorty 1991:33). Therefore,
Rorty is hopeful that, as postmodern human beings increasingly exercise their poetic powers of self-
creation, worries about metaphysical questions—but, particularly, a desire for transcendent powers—
would die the death of "benign neglect" (Rorty 1995:195).
This discussion of Rorty’s "tone-deafness" to divine otherness, and his predilection for a humanism
without transcendence, serves to create an opening for a genuinely postmetaphysical construal of
religious faith and of God’s reality, in two ways: First, the fact that Rorty’s intellectual commitments find
their roots in the conceptual and moral assumptions of a very specific philosophical tradition—namely,
the Enlightenment tradition with its privileging of human autonomy—relativizes Rorty’s critique of
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theology in the following way: It makes the theologian dubious enough about the movitations behind
Rorty’s dismissal of God that she may be emboldened to look for new ways of construing the divine
reality that the assumptions of Rorty’s intellectual heritage would make him either unable or unwilling to
countenance. Second, the theologian may agree with Rorty’s critique of metaphysics—and even theology
—as he defines these intellectual traditions. However, the theologian may rightly take issue with Rorty’s
counsel that we will be better off to simply abandon the divine in favor of secular societies of strong
poets. For that counsel, together with Rorty’s suggestion that "a world of pragmatic atheists . . . would be
a better, happier world" (Rorty 1995:195), is not the consequence of a sustained argument. Rather, it is
the function of an existential choice—after drawing a moral about the ongoing utility of his metaphysical
heritage—to adopt a certain self-image of what would make for human freedom and flourishing. The
theologian may certainly retort that Rorty’s casual foreclosure on her own existential choice to wager her
life on the fragile hope that human freedom and flourishing lie in the possibilities opened up precisely by
a postmetaphysical experience of the transcendent God, is disingenuous and illegitimate. The demise of
metaphysics (and theology as Rorty defines it) does not necessarily lead to a "happy atheism"; unless, of
course, one shares Rorty’s prior existential commitment that the only worthy utopia is one bereft of
experiences of divine transcendence. That is to say, disappointment over the putative failure of
metaphysics does not logically entail a secular existence in which "no trace of divinity remained. . . ."
Nor, therefore, does it occlude the legitimacy of wagering a religious faith on the rhetorical possibilities
proffered by a genuinely postmetaphysical construal of the divine Reality.
III
In this final section of the paper, I will respond to Rorty’s conceptual and ethical objections to theology’s
desire for a transcendent God alluded to earlier in the paper. My response clearly will not be a full-
fledged doctrine of God; rather, I will make some brief comments on how a postmetaphysical construal
of God’s reality would address Rorty’s objections. To do so, I turn for insight to the theological model
proffered by Mark I. Wallace in his recent book, Fragments of the Spirit: Nature, Violence, and the
Renewal of Creation (1996). In it, Wallace offers a promising way of construing God’s reality in a
postmetaphysical key. While there is no way to do justice to the subtlety and complexity of Wallace’s
argument in the remaining pages of this paper, I want simply to allude to one or two of its salient
features in order to address Rorty’s objections.
Let us look first at Rorty’s conceptual objections to the Christian desire for a transcendent God. By
refusing to think of God under the philosophical categories of being, a postmetaphysical model avoids the
conceptual aporias Rorty associates with metaphysical flights from history, time, and contingency. For
God is neither Tillich’s "ground of being" nor philosophy’s "highest existent, [its] ens a se, pure
actuality, being-itself . . . prima causa" (Wallace 1996:64-65). Captive to these categories of Being,
God’s transcendent reality is often portrayed in just the ahistorical, atemporal, extralinguistic ways which
Rorty so forcefully criticizes. Rather, Wallace follows thinkers like Jean-Luc Marion in asserting that
God should be envisaged as without being (65). Ironically, only by extricating God’s reality from the
metaphysical categories of being, can God’s authentic transcendence by maintained. The totalizing nature
of metaphysical conceptualizations simply cannot "account for the arbitrary nature of the Other whose
reality cannot be grasped, objectified, calculated, or categorized" (65-66).
Wallace proposes that a fruitful way to bypass the reifying metaphysical categories of being is through a
retrieval of the biblical-theological understanding of God as Spirit (Wallace 1996:65). Admittedly, to
Pieterse -- Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/pieterse.html[9/18/2009 5:09:19 PM]
accomplish this means overcoming modern suspicions of spirit as either Hegel’s all-consuming World
Spirit (78) or as a supernatural, vapid, ethereal reality transcending history, language, and contingency
(121-122). For Wallace, these suspicions are countered, however, by rendering the Spirit’s reality not in
the terms of substance or being but rather rhetorically "in relation to the structures of lived existence"
(122). A rhetorical construal of the Spirit means that the Spirit exists in a transformative relationship
with the concrete social systems that alternately serve to block and enable human renewal. The Spirit is
not a self-subsistent, static entity that exists apart from its coinherence with other living beings. Rather,
the Spirit has its very life in communion with the liberative and healing relationships that various persons
and groups share with one another. This approach desubstantializes the Spirit and understands the Spirit’s
work in adjectival rather than nominative terms, in spite of the way the word "Spirit" is conventionally
used as the syntactic subject. Far from this model denying the reality of the Spirit, it rather posits this
reality as a dynamic life-force that circulates among the transformative power relations that undergird
aspects of postmodern culture (Wallace 1996:122-123).
By "desubstantializing" the Spirit’s reality—by refusing to consider the Spirit "a self-subsistent, static
entity"—and by insisting on the Spirit’s "coinherence with other living beings," a rhetorical
understanding of the Spirit affirms the utterly historical, linguistic, and contingent nature of God’s reality.
Indeed, as Spirit, God has no reality apart from history, time, and language. The Spirit’s radical inherence
in the concretions of history, time, and language is of a piece with thinking of the Spirit’s work as
"adjectival" rather than "nominative." "Adjectival" delineates the Spirit’s as power. Specifically, the
Spirit emerges as the normative power of transformation and healing in "concrete social systems." Power
is radically relational, which means it has no reality apart from its concretions in historical and social
situations. Limning the Spirit as power suggests that the Spirit need not—indeed, should not—be
hypostasized: The Spirit is not self-subsistent, capable of sustaining an existence apart from the dynamic
of power relations that constitute concrete social and historical contexts. Instead, the Spirit reality—God’s
reality—just is the normative power to effect transformation and healing in concrete historical situations.
For my model, then, God’s reality—God’s "being," if you will—is historical without remainder. God’s
reality is coterminous with its instantiations in the contingencies of history, time, and chance. Such a
radically historicist construal of God’s reality renders the divine fragile, subject to vicissitudes of renewal
and decay that accompany historical change. As William Dean has said, a historicist theology considers
whatever is real—including the reality of God—to be "conceived within history, directed at history, and
grown in a historical chain . . ." (Dean 1988:1).
But a postmetaphysical theology must resolutely eschew the "metaphysical comfort" of what Dean calls
an "older historicism," which, while acknowledging the ever-changing realities of history, time, and
contingency, nevertheless argued that "beneath the change there was a structure impervious to the
vicissitudes of time and perspective and that the thinker’s job was to introduce that structure into present
history as faithfully as possible" (Dean 1988:4). More often than not, Christian theologians construed this
abiding, ontological "structure" as God. However, it is just this rearguard action to smuggle in a
metaphysics of the finally extrahistorical Divine Being that a historicist, postmetaphysical theologian
cannot accept. For to do that, she reasons, is to expose the theologian to the range of Rorty’s criticisms
of metaphysics all over again.
Insinuating God’s reality without remainder in the vicissitudes of history, contingency, and chance raises
this question: Does the claim of God’s radical inherence in concrete historical contexts not evacuate
God’s being of any transcendence? In other words, does a postmetaphysical theology purchase the
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historicity of God at the expense of God’s "otherness," thus violating the "deep structure" of Christian
faith? Further complicating the issue is the fact that, as the earlier discussion showed, for Rorty, it is
precisely when metaphysicians and theologians "go transcendental" (see Rorty 1982:173) that imminent
flights from history, time, and contingency are not far behind. The challenge before a postmetaphysical
Christian theology is, then, just how to affirm God’s genuine "otherness," but in a thoroughgoing
historicist key.
Perhaps the place to begin is to uncouple the issue of God’s transcendence from Rorty’s problematic
construal of it. As we saw, Rorty’s interpretation of transcendence as necessarily a relation of the
historical to the ahistorical, the temporal to the atemporal, and so forth, occludes a radically historicist
understanding of God’s transcendent Reality—for it construes transcendence as a static, ontological
relation of mutual exclusion: either historical existence utterly devoid of epiphanic moments ("the gods
are dead") or epistemic and moral constraint by ahistorical, metaphysical powers. A postmetaphysical
theologian will not be misled by the "contrastive" logic of Rorty’s dichotomous view; in fact, she will
reject it. For if, as the historicist theologian would have it, God is not the ahistorical, metaphysical Entity
Rorty makes him out to be, but instead is thoroughly insinuated in the passage of history, time, and
contingency, then God’s transcendence—God’s "otherness"—is entirely historical too. The ineluctably
historical nature of God’s otherness, therefore, necessarily requires a different logic from that of Rorty’s
position. I contend that a rhetorical construal of the polyphonic witness of the biblical text suggests a
logic of the Spirit’s transcendent reality which moves the historicist theologian beyond the tired stalemate
Rorty’s position has created.
But how exactly will it do that? It does so by suggesting that the logic of God’s otherness derives
crucially from the identity of the divine Other mediated through the plural discourses of the biblical text.
Contra Rorty, God is not a metaphysical entity "discovered" underneath the multiple layers of the text,
waiting to be adequately represented by the proper theological or metaphysical language. Rather, as we
saw earlier, limned in the register of power the divine Other is a reality whose very identity emerges from
within the dynamic play of the concrete interpretive situation. The historical nature of the Spirit’s reality
means that God’s transcendence, far from being a static, ontological relation between history and the
ahistorical, is actually a function of the dynamic relational interplay between text and interpreter in a
concrete context. But of what exactly does God’s transcendence exist in a concrete interpretive situation?
How exactly is God "other"? Once again, it is the identity of the divine Spirit emerging from the
polyphonic interplay of the Bible’s multiple discourses that holds the clue to the meaning of the
transcendent relation. Recall that we described the Spirit as the normative power of transformation,
liberation, and healing in a given social context. The "otherness" of the Spirit resides precisely in the
normativity of the power relations comprising the hermeneutical context. That is, God’s transcendence
constitutes the othering power of liberating love in a historical situation. Precisely to the extent that it
enables liberation the divine love transcends the constraints and limited resources of a given situation.
Divine transcendence is thus transposed into a moral-ethical key: The Spirit is experienced as
transcendent in a concrete interpretive context just insofar as she brings to the situation morally and
spiritually superior resources for transformation, liberation, and healing. Put another way, through a
rhetorical imaginative engagement with the biblical text, the "otherness" of God is experienced as the lure
of new modes of being—of transcendent existential possibilities. Or, in the language of the Christian
theological tradition, the otherness of the divine Mystery is the otherness of grace, of the promise of a
radically new way of being in the world.
Pieterse -- Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/pieterse.html[9/18/2009 5:09:19 PM]
Construing God’s otherness in the way I have prohibits interpreting transcendence as either a generic
quality of the divine life or as a static, ontological relation between eternity and time. Rather, God’s
otherness is always the function of the normativity of power within a concrete historical context. This
makes the Spirit’s otherness radically contextual. Because ineluctably insinuated in the power relations of
a particular historical context, God is always "situationally transcendent," to borrow Jerome Stone’s
felicitous phrase. The Spirit’s transcendence—her gracious ability to bring liberation and healing—is
thus a fragile and vulnerable performance; indeed, it is as fragile and vulnerable—even fickle—as the
historical contexts within which the Spirit is insinuated.
With Rorty, a postmetaphysical, historicist theology considers the ahistorical god of metaphysics,
together with the phantom security and stability it offers, more trouble than it’s worth. But contra Rorty,
the theologian perceives in the death of the metaphysical deity an opening for refiguring the divine reality
as the transcendent-as-normative agent of liberation and healing.
Speaking of God’s transcendence in a moral-ethical register also helps to respond to the second of
Rorty’s objections to theology; namely, that the Christian desire for a transcendent God is ethically
undesirable. Recall two aspects of Rorty’s critique: First, he claims that the existence of transcendent
realities—including the gods—is fundamentally opposed to projects of human flourishing and freedom.
Second, since the divine entities thought up by metaphysics get in the way of human self-creation, we
lucky inhabitants of twentieth-century North Atlantic democracies should increasingly rely on our own
imagination and resources, and persuade as many of our theistic friends that they too can live without the
metaphysical comfort of divine providence. In other words, as travelers on the way to Rorty’s liberal
utopia, we should try our best to redescribe our self-image in such a completely secular fashion that the
desire to worship anything at all would wither away, would simply lose its point.
Again, I will make just one or two brief comments. First, as has been pointed out on several occasions in
the previous discussion, Rorty’s verdict that belief in any form of transcendent sacred reality is inimical
to human freedom and flourishing is a direct function of his uncompromising relegation of the divine to
the realm of the ahistorical and the atemporal. This necessitates a contrastive relation in which the
transcendent powers unilaterally constrain their human counterparts, compelling them to see the
immutable "nature of reality," the "truth about the world," "the will of God," or whatever. Such a
coercive relation naturally impugns the integrity of human creativity and self-determination.
Note, however, that without Rorty’s ahistorical God, there is no oppressive transcendent relation either.
So, the postmetaphysical, historicist construal of God’s transcendent reality outlined thus far seems to
open up conceptual space for rethinking the nature of human relation to the sacred in such a way that it
elides Rorty’s charge of antihumanism. Again, the key to responding to Rorty’s ethical objection resides
in how the divine Other is identified. If the Spirit is the power of liberating love emerging from within
the dynamic power relations in concrete situations, then she lures but never coerces, persuades but never
constrains, beckons but never compels. Indeed, to coerce, constrain, or compel would be to
fundamentally contradict the nature of love. Moreover, precisely as liberating love the "otherness" of the
Spirit is experienced as the gracious lure of superior moral and spiritual resources for the journey to
wholeness and selfhood (see Wallace 1996:59).
Furthermore, since the Spirit is always already insinuated in the polyphonic and often conflictual
dynamic of relations of power that characterize concrete historical contexts, the Spirit’s power is never
unilateral, and thus never coercive. Indeed, as we saw earlier, the gracious identity of the divine Other in
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a concrete, historical situation is always a product of both the interpreter’s creative imagination and the
"new modes of being in the world that the [biblical] text imagines" (Wallace 1993:239). The non-
coercive logic of the perichoretic relation between the Spirit’s reality and the interpreter thus produces an
interpretive context in which the interpreter in freedom both creates and discovers. As Wallace puts it so
well: "Insofar as the one who wagers religious hope discovers novel possibilities for existence within the
imaginative discourses of a religious tradition, she is also empowered to invent a life that is a recovery of
those very values and possibilities" (Wallace 1995:59).
If my case for God’s transcendence so far holds, then the following conclusion would appear plausible:
Pace Rorty, the theologian has resources for construing God’s transcendent reality in a postmetaphysical
register that is radically historicist, and for characterizing the logic of that transcendent relation in a way
that does not impugn human freedom and flourishing—on that contrary, it promotes and enables these
desiderata.
IV
It is unlikely that my postmetaphysical, radically historicist construal of the Christian God would satisfy
Rorty—even if it could be shown that this model accounts adequately for Rorty’s conceptual and ethical
objections to transcendence. For, fundamentally, the offense to Rorty’s moral sensibilities is the
Christian’s desire for a transcendent deity at all. Indeed, Rorty’s hope is for a thoroughly secular utopia
in which "no trace of divinity remained" (Rorty 1989:45)—one in which all longings for transcendence
would have died the death of "benign neglect" (see Rorty 1995:195). This hope is fueled by Rorty’s
wager that "a world of pragmatic atheists . . . would be a better, happier world than our present one"
(195).
To call Rorty’s hope for a world of "pragmatic atheists" a wager is important; for it helps us see that the
existential choice of what values, principles, and practices should orient one’s life—the choice of what
Rorty calls one’s "final vocabulary"—is not settled by a context-transcending theory of truth or
rationality. Indeed, as Rorty has pointed out, there is no "noncircular argumentative recourse" (Rorty
1989:73) when it comes to defending the fundamental assumptions of one’s final vocabulary. However,
while both Rorty and the Christian theologian can certainly provide good reasons for committing
themselves to their respective final vocabularies, as good pragmatists they also know that trying to decide
the utility of incommensurable forms of life at this level of abstraction is futile and counterproductive.
They both know that, ultimately, the "difference that makes a difference" resides not in the coherent
logic of a theory, but in the practical fecundity of concrete forms of life: Do these forms of life foster
solidarity and create concrete communities of freedom and flourishing? This question transposes the
choice between emulating Rorty’s strong poet and continuing to wager one’s existence on the
possibilities and values of a religious tradition into a pragmatic inquiry about the moral and spiritual
resources of these two forms of life to enable meaningful lives. Transferring the dialogue to a practical
one about consequences and ends, may embolden the theologian to inquire whether "[b]eyond Rorty’s
Enlightenment dedivinization of the world for the sake of human flourishing, . . . an apprenticeship to the
new modes of being projected by the divine Other might not be a more authentic mode of liberation than
Rortian self-creation" (Wallace 1996:61). As in Rorty’s case, this musing too is just a wager. But, for
the Christian at least, it is a wager that solicits an act of fragile trust and hope—and an invitation to risk a
life heeding the call of an enigmatic Spirit who blows where she wills.
And that is a risk I am prepared to take—at least for now.
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